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The purpose of the following article is to show that for its survival capitalism requires 
expanding mass incomes and that the dominant interpretation of growth relying on ever increasing 
shares of the rich in national income is misguided. Capitalism is an achievement involuntarily 
imposed by the poor onto the rich of society. The rich gain wealth by a large variety of means, 
very often not by the discipline capitalism requires and imposes through competition. The article 
concentrates on two aspects: the conditions of making expanding mass incomes the basis of 
capitalist transition in not yet capitalist underdeveloped economies, and the importance of such a 
transition for maintaining capitalism at the global level where a globalisation of rent against 
globalisation of profit is the intention of the forces of capital. Therefore many other very relevant 
aspects of the theoretical model can only be shortly outlined.  
 
1.  SOME ASPECTS OF THE THEORETICAL BACKGROUND OF  
MASS CONSUMPTION BASED CAPITALISM
1
 
Following Kalecki (1942) and Luxemburg (1923: esp.107–119), profit is based on 
net spending on investment, but such net spending on investment requires expanding 
markets. As long as capitalists compete with each other, they cannot arbitrarily increase 
their own consumption, nor tolerate the increase of the consumption of their directly 
dependent classes. Accumulation can barely exceed expansion of total production, 
because otherwise rising capital output ratios ultimately lead to increasing unit costs, 
which would lead to the current bankers‘ and Lenin‘s (1899: 42f.) solution of demand 
creation by accelerating accumulation failing. The constant capital output ratio in most 
developed industrial countries for the last 150 years is proof of this argument. Where the 
ruling class cannot constitute monopolies, the only solution for the necessary expansion 
of demand consists in expanding mass incomes. This expansion is possible on the one 
hand by higher levels of employment which lead to productivity-oriented wage increases 
as described in neoclassical theory or by the increased bargaining power of labour. Both 
conditions are normally interrelated: rising mass incomes contribute to increasing 
employment, and increasing employment contributes to better conditions for political 
organisation of the working class. 
Rising mass incomes are a precondition for capitalist growth, such that the absence 
of empowerment of labour will block capitalism. The typical underdeveloped economy is 
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characterised by a surplus of labour, which keeps average skilled labour from 
empowerment regardless of the levels of productivity of some elements of the labour 
force. Therefore, to achieve the transition to capitalism it cannot be achieved only by 
increasing market relations but requires the mobilisation of rents for supporting marginal 
labour, i.e. labour which produces less than it needs to survive, which at any possible 
wage rate is less productive than its cost of employment. Under the actual conditions of 
globalisation, i.e. competitiveness of labour in poor economies of the South through their 
capacity to devalue the currency, the lack of empowerment of labour in the South is 
having a knock on effect for the disempowerment of labour in the West. We are facing 
the alternative between a globalisation of profit against a globalisation of rent. 
The contention of so-called capitalists, whom I term ―rentiers‖, that their 
accumulation of more and more resources pushes growth has until now gone mostly 
unchallenged. The difference between capitalist modes of production and non-
capitalist ones is that in capitalist ones such interpretations have until now been of 
little relevance. What the powerful think about the conditions of growth by 
accumulation has been irrelevant, as long as labour is able to impose increasing mass 
incomes. In history, the labour movement has not really cared about winning in 
ideological battles in the West. Mainstream economics is a convincing demonstration 
of its own irrelevance, especially during crisis. During the recent economic crisis, no 
major country in the West followed neoclassical theory, which advocated 
overcoming the crisis by additional savings. 
The myopic image of capitalism as increasing exploitation and causing the 
impoverishment of large masses has been for more than half a century unmindful to 
economic history, especially related to the early wage increases in  Britain and the United 
States, but also in Japan and Germany. Historical research has established that with the 
exception of the period of the French wars of the late 18th and early 19th century, and 
later during the 20th century world wars, real incomes of the masses increased in Britain 
with the increases in production and productivity [Crafts (1985: 103); Elsenhans (2014: 
54)], and more rapidly in terms of purchasing power for non-agricultural products than 
for agricultural products [Broadberry and Gupta (2006: 4)]. 
Defining capitalism as being dependent on rising mass incomes does not imply 
that capitalists contribute to rising mass incomes. The interests as defined by a ruling 
class are more often the perils of the functioning of a successful economic system than its 
promotion of one, as shown by Ibn Khaldûn for the Arab city states (1967: 569–577). 
There is no room here to discuss whether cultural traditions and political arrangements in 
pre-industrial Europe made the struggle of the poor easier than in the well-ordered 
ancient empires of Asia, which I term tributary modes of production. As the rise in the 
poor‘s incomes is basically the result of a power relation in their favour, a large variety of 
factors may have contributed, such as demographic decline, political rivalries within the 
ruling class, cultural norms favourable to the notion of equality of all human beings, and 
other factors. They have existed in different parts of the world in different combinations 
at different times, so that the European case has to be explained on the basis of accidental 
historical contingencies. 
Certainly capitalism implies a restructuring of society, as described in the Marxist 
idea about primitive accumulation, but to the difference of Marx not in the form of the 
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misery of the great mass of the population, rather in the form of protecting the masses 
from impoverishment when traditional mechanisms of solidarity were destroyed by 
increasing market penetration of society. The ―doubly free‖ proletarian (separated from 
his means of production and free to sell his labour power), whom Marx (1867: 183, 742) 
describes as a constitutive element of capitalism, and primary accumulation can only 
emerge when workers consider it as probable that they may gain employment. Public 
sector programmes like the Poor Laws in England [Elsenhans (1992)] are not proof of 
intensified exploitation as Marx had argued, but of redistribution by which the rent on the 
land owners is reduced by a parish tax used for the support of poor people. The poor 
spend money mostly on food and simple products so that the market for simple products 
expands, with some produced by machines. During the whole Industrial Revolution, 
Britain had comparative advantage in simple machine produced products, even if the 
engineers organising this production were not conscious of this and instead tried to 
compete with China in luxuries [Berg (2006: 283f.)]. Britain conquered the world market, 
not because of quality products but because of cheap products. The improvement of the 
nutritional state of the great mass of the English population and the increase of per-capita 
food production has been argued in English agricultural history since the 1930s. The 
previous position argued that the rural masses had been impoverished by their 
displacement from agriculture by enclosures [Overton (1996)]. Rising mass incomes are a 
condition of capitalist growth not the consequence of them [Allen (2009: 14ff.)], although 
the possibilities for rising mass incomes rises if productivity increases through capitalist 
growth. The decisive link is that luxury consumption leads less to capitalist growth than 
mass consumption does. 
The actual attempt to avoid rising mass incomes through creating demand by 
lavish financial policies requires market imperfections in the form of state protection of 
financial markets; protections which ultimately destroy competitive capitalism and 
transform financial capitalists into protected rent collectors through financialisation.  
Keynes‘s argument about an active role of money has been hijacked by his opponents: 
Keynes suggests expansionary monetary policies in order to achieve rapidly high levels 
of employment. The neoclassical mechanism of the wage drift can show its existence 
under this circumstance. Defending mass income-based capitalism should therefore be a 
key strategy for blocking the transition of the global system into an faux capitalist one 
actually based on state-protected financial markets.  
 
2. UNDERDEVELOPMENT, MARGINALITY AND THE  
STRUCTURAL BLOCKAGE OF CAPITALISM 
Development theory and development policy are like Keynesianism children of the 
great economic depression of the 1930s: the point of departure is proving wrong the 
argument of the liberals that capitalism is capable of restoring high-level employment 
equilibria. Hence, the penetration of capitalist relations of production could no longer be 
expected to lead to capitalism as the liberals and the historical school in Germany 
(Werner Sombart) had assumed. The colonial powers realised that developing social 
crises benefitted the national liberation movement. 
Due to the politically threatening impoverishment of the population, it was clear in 
early development theory that cheap labour would not produce development. The central 
4 Hartmut Elsenhans 
problem of development policy was formulated: a surplus of readily available cheap, 
exploitable labour did not lead to accumulation and growth even if there was wealth, 
hence the theory of labour surplus [Lewis (1954)] which coexisted with more or less 
financial surpluses. Since its beginnings, development theory accepted as central the 
absence of the conditions for the spontaneous emergence of capitalism in backward 
countries. 
Surplus labour is marginal, i.e. labour which produces less income than its 
subsistence under existing conditions of demand and supply. Low incomes coincide 
with a high share of agricultural production. Scarcity of land implies a decreasing 
marginal product of additional workers [Elsenhans (1994: 394–397)]. Population 
growth will lead to people producing less than their costs of subsistence. Growing 
employment may increase production, but at least at some level of labour input the 
additional product value declines enough that it becomes less than the additional 
requirements for feeding an additional worker and his family [Georgescu-Roegen 
(1960)]. This level of marginal product can be defined as the threshold of 
marginality, as any additional worker produces less than his cost and can be 
maintained only by redistributive measures. Pre-capitalist solidarity structures had 
for long preserved these marginals, but whenever landowners maximise surplus they 
will shed this labour, transforming marginal workers into marginalised people. 
Marginals could survive only if there were mechanisms through which private  actors 
like kin, family, public institutions or the well-meaning landlord (the marginal being 
an asset in powers struggles for him) supported them through a subsidy. Such a 
subsidy was financed from the surplus and this part of the surplus was appropriated 
by non-market means, what I term a rent. 
Where there is marginal labour which cannot access a sufficient income on the 
basis of its productivity, all other labour with average skills is weak as it can easily be 
replaced by workers from the reserve of marginal labour. Marginal labour depends for its 
survival on the magnanimity of others. In most large families, there are some members 
who hold labour contracts where they earn more than their costs of reproduction. There 
are obligations of re-distribution, which allow the marginals amongst the group to reap 
charity. The unspoken condition is that these economically marginal members of the 
group will not put into danger the access of the privileged members of the group to their 
‗above subsistence‘ work contracts. The simplest requirement for the marginal members 
in the group is not to rebel against the existing order.  
The often criticised submissive attitudes of the poor in relation to the powerful are 
not the result of cultural tradition but a rational strategy given the economic imperatives. 
In addition, penny capitalism demonstrates the rationality of the poor of the 
underdeveloped South and skewers arguments of cultural determinants in economic 
outcomes [Tax (1964); de Soto (1989)]. 
Marginality has an important consequence for the dynamics of class formation. In 
a capitalist economy which tends to full employment, wage rates tend to converge into a 
hierarchical set where labour effort and physical or psychological burden determine 
differences. This process is facing opposition in existing capitalist economies by the fact 
that they no longer tend to full employment under the conditions of globalisation. In 
Germany, for the last 15 years the difference between the low paid hair dresser and the 
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highly paid hewer in coal mining was 1:2.
2
 Branch differences only exceptionally 
exceeded 33 percent, despite very different skill requirements between the best paying 
branches (e.g. energy supply) and the less lucrative branches (e.g. restaurants) 
[Statistisches Jahrbuch (1984: 380-381)].  
Wage differences do not follow branch specific productivity differences; the 
convergence of sectoral and branch-wise productivities in monetary terms is not the result 
of any harmonious development of economy-wide increases of physical productivity. 
Salaries in highly productive branches increase initially when entrepreneurs attract 
workers with high salaries. If there are high levels of employment this process is 
accompanied by scarcity of labour in more traditional branches of production. The 
entrepreneurs of these branches have to reduce output. Customers are ready to pay higher 
prices. Wage increases follow average and not activity-related productivity increases 
[Salter (1960): 161]. A branch of production which has not enjoyed any productivity 
increase will be able to pay higher wages in parallel with the rise in average productivity 
and hence wages akin to other more dynamic branches. Wherever there is no scarcity of 
labour, innovation in a specific branch will lead to increasing wages in this branch only if 
the branch requires workers with rare skills, but not if average skills are needed 
(assembly line type operations) or in other branches where there has been no productivity 
increase. Wages will therefore stagnate. As productivities measured in monetary terms 
will be determined under perfect competition by the cost, with different levels of wages, 
productivities will diverge between branches such that with respect to branch wise 
productivities these economies will be structurally heterogeneous [Nohlen (1982: 95–
97)]. They will tend to be inflexible as capital is hesitant to flow from high productivity 
branches to low productivity ones. Small price changes will not necessarily lead to 
flexible adaptation. 
The homogenisation of the economic situation of working people does not take 
place: the economic basis for the emergence of powerful class organisations does not 
emerge.  
Capitalism in its flexibility and absence of power-based appropriation of surplus is 
an extremely unstable relation. Capitalism reacts to instabilities with political 
interventions by ―elites‖ (as in other modes of production). In periods of crises, these 
elites appropriate surplus by political means and then spend it by political distribution on 
their consumptive and power interests (military). In capitalism this type of crisis 
management contradicts its basic set up because it counters the liberating tendencies of 
capitalism (which do not exist in state-dominated pre-capitalist systems such that 
interventions by the elites do not upset these systems). Capitalism is not more unstable 
than other modes of production but more threatened than non-capitalist structures in its 
maintenance.  
Wherever labour becomes disempowered, ruling classes in capitalism shift to rent 
seeking and political safeguards to secure their access to surplus. The failures and crises 
 
2
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and hence economic flexibility in capitalism result from scarcity of labour, which translates as empowerment of 
labour. Obviously, the more labour is disempowered also in the leading industrialised countries (e.g. USA), the 
less the prescribed tendency of convergence is operating. Globalisation threatens by disempowerment 
fundamental elements of capitalism in the  ―centre‖, another element for demonstrating the close link between 
empowerment of labour and capitalism. Cf. Elsenhans (2014: esp. 166–169).  
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in the transition to capitalism in European history, as well as the new challenges for 
maintaining capitalism in the face of the globalisation upheavals, demonstrate that 
capitalists consistently seek refuge in political measures which promote rent-seeking 
whenever the social conditions for appropriation of profit weaken because of labour 
disempowerment (lower wages and higher unemployment). Capitalist reactions to crises 
are not appropriate for strengthening the basis of capitalism, but may even lead to the 
further weakening of its basis. 
The singularity of the now capitalist countries, in particular Europe and the regions 
of European settlement, do not constitute a specific European culture which draws its 
origin from religion, institutions of participation, ideologies, or the equality of humans, 
but basically from accidental conditions for the empowerment of labour. Such cultural 
factors as mentioned in the vast literature which allege the uniqueness of the West may 
be of some value but those characteristics may equally have been present in other 
cultures. They may have reached in Europe an accidental ‗critical mass‘3 for a variety of 
accidental reasons. 
Development politics and economics have to ultimately contribute to the 
strategically central mechanism for achieving capitalism: increasing mass employment. 
This can go with eclecticism of types and levels of interventions covering a large variety 
of issues. It is not the statist form which causes the limits to labour integrating markets 
and popular participation, but the temptations of self-privileging and concentration of 
power which are inherent in rents. Much hailed alternative agents, especially non-
governmental organisations, have proved not to be immune against self-privilege and 
forcing measures on uncommitted target groups [Elsenhans (1995: 149–153, 1991, 211)]. 
It is therefore imperative to detect possibilities to short circuit the opportunities for 
diversion away from rent-based social structures, and discover settings where the use 
large resources for development goals in the interest of the masses function as automatic 
as possible. This will be clarified by dealing with three major programmes for mobilising 
rents. 
 
3.  MOBILISING RENTS IN FAVOURABLE POLITICAL SETTINGS 
That modernisation theory in its multiple variants consisted in the mobilisation of 
a surplus which private entrepreneurs could not appropriate for lack of investment 
opportunities does not need further discussion. It failed because the planners were not 
caring for large mass markets, which could be supplied on the basis of (also) locally 
produced technology, such that there would be a local process of skill creation. Without 
expanding mass markets, capital-output ratios were high and investment for quality 
reasons depended on imported technology. 
Agrarian reform consists in the redirection of available rents previously wasted by 
landlords for the upkeep of poor and often marginal people. Endowing each nuclear 
family with an equal share in total fertile land will not render these people prosperous. 
They still have very little land and face diminishing returns on their small farms. In order 
to survive they will mobilise additional labour time, even if additional yields are low, but 
positive [Elsenhans (1979),  Janvry and Ground (1979)]. Rent, which in the English Poor 
 
3A term from nuclear physics when a critical mass is the smallest amount of fissile material needed for 
a sustained nuclear chain reaction. 
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Laws accrued to the landlord and was taken afterwards by the parish in order to subsidise 
the marginals, here goes directly to the small farmers who can survive with this rent if 
they are ready to provide their labour time. Even if additional incomes are very low total 
production and total productive work time increase. The demand for industrial products is 
re-oriented to simple products manufactured in large quantities, possibly with locally 
produced technology, so that employment in the industrial sector can increase.  
On each of these farms there is the problem of decreasing returns. The typical rural 
family receives large yields with only part of its available labour. As long as these yields 
do not suffice for survival, labour input into the farm is increased or other activities will 
be pursued. When the low yielding additional work on the farm yields less than industrial 
employment, the family provides additional labour to ( sometimes) export-oriented small 
and medium scale industries at below average wages. They can accept wages below the 
average wage necessary for survival, because they achieve above average incomes from 
their relatively productive ―first‖ hours  of work on their farms. Those people who have 
no access to the highly remunerative ―first‖ hours on an own family farm have to earn 
―average wages‖ in order to survive [Dasgupta and Ray (1987: 177)]. This explains the 
very low wages in the typical East Asian export-oriented economies for temporarily 
employed workers, e.g. young female workers before getting married. 
The debate on the relation between the size of farms and yields per acre which 
developed, especially in India, is misplaced [Schaller (2006)]. At the limit, the issue is 
not whether large farms have higher yields than small farms but whether the incomes 
generated on large farms (partly rents for better-off landlords) create similarly strong 
incentives for the production of simple industrial products and local technology 
promotion as the demand which originates from poor farmers.  
The decisive aspect of an egalitarian redistribution of land consists in reducing 
marginality by transferring a rent to the marginals without large scale administrative 
intervention, which is always prone to waste, or even, corruption. Giving the land to the 
poor creates a minimum income. The recklessness of liberalisation in mainland China 
with its dire and much criticised consequences for the lower income strata, especially in 
the urban centres, does not seem to have produced the dire poverty to be found in 
mainland South Asia. The only reason which can be given is the possibility of resistance 
of the very poor against such bad conditions on the labour market because they had the 
possibility to return to their villages and to produce at least for their subsistence. 
An initially simple technology industrial sector, which produces for mass needs 
and starts developing its own technologies can be called a popular pole of industry 
[Elsenhans (2014: 40f.)]. Such an industry can emerge even under conditions of 
underdevelopment. 
The mobilisation of rent from already productive sectors for supporting 
diversification of the economy and overcoming underdevelopment is also decisive in the 
case of export-oriented manufacturing. Those countries which succeeded in this were 
able to devalue their currencies below purchasing power parity [recently on Pakistan: 
Ahmed (2010)]. In most cases, real incomes were up to ten times as high as the 
purchasing power of their local wages in international currency [Chen, et al. (1994)]. The 
priority of the exchange rate in explaining the cheap international cost of labour is 
glaringly obvious when Western conservatives warn their workers [already described by 
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Marx (1867: 700)]  that there are workers in the rest of the world who work for 1/50 of 
the cost. As no worker in a Western industrialised country can survive at 1/50 of his 
salary, the low-cost export workers in the newly exporting countries of the South can 
only be based on the availability of wage goods at cheaper prices than in the West. A 
rising working population in the new manufacturing exporters can only survive if local 
agriculture produces a food surplus for these additional export workers as well as for 
those workers in industry who have to produce additional wage goods for that same rising 
number of export sector workers [Elsenhans (2002: 67f.)]. 
Export-oriented manufacturing will lead to an expansion of the internal market if 
earnings of the workers in the export sector increase. Multiplier effects of their additional 
incomes on the rest of the local economy also lead to more employment and, if strong 
enough, scarcity of labour. If workers have an alternative, even alternative low sources of 
income, export producers have to attract additional labour by offering better wages. 
Korean economists sawa turning point when wages no longer only increased in the export 
sectors but also for those producing for the internal market [Bai (1982:122)]. Through an 
increase in their numbers and their incomes, increasing demand from workers in the 
export sector will lead to more local production of mass consumption goods with more 
multipliers and more employment in the internal market oriented production lines.  
More egalitarian societies are able to benefit more from export-oriented 
manufacturing than in egalitarian ones. Expanding internal markets on the basis of 
increasing mass incomes has been important for the better growth performance of 
countries like South Korea, Thailand, China, and Vietnam in comparison to countries like 
the Philippines, India and Pakistan [even within one country: Lange (2009: 127)]. The 
successful export-oriented industrialising countries initially had an egalitarian distribution 
of income and food self-sufficiency.  
The requirement of empowerment of labour as a positive component to the success 
of export-oriented manufacturing is not contradicted by the increasingly unequal income 
distribution in these countries: this inequality has not precluded rising mass incomes. 
Partly it is a statistical artefact as the poor predominantly consume products where the 
prices correspond to the strategy of devaluation and are considerably cheaper than on the 
world market, whereas the prices of the products consumed by the rich are aligning more 
or less with world market prices as they are internationally tradable luxuries. 
As long as export workers consume mostly local products, the supply of local 
products in greater quantities does not raise the international price of this labour. This 
depends ultimately on the capacity of local agriculture to produce a surplus for the 
emerging market, which is constituted by the additional purchasing power of workers 
who receive wages in the export sector even if their incomes are so low that they cannot 
buy the same food from the world market. This surplus would otherwise not have been 
produced for the market—constituting a rent.  
Devaluation is costly. Productivity is not uniformly lower in underdeveloped 
countries in relation to the technological world leaders. The range of products appropriate 
for local production increases if rates of devaluation increase. Particularly in the case of 
goods with low price-elasticity of demand, exports which have been competitive even 
before further devaluation have to be taxed if losses in foreign-exchange should be 
avoided. The model example is the blocking of textile machinery imports by South Korea 
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when their textile exports faced an increasingly price in elastic demand on the world 
market [Haggard (1983: 83); Mytelka (1986: 258)]. Textile exporters had to order locally 
produced expensive textile machinery (which were initially expensive) from their spare 
part suppliers to whom they transferred their technical knowledge. The additional cost of 
the locally produced machines was charged to the textile exports with limited losses in 
export earnings given the low price elasticity of demand. The described mechanism is not 
completely different from the appropriation of rent by an oil country for financing 
industrialisation programmes.  
Under the conditions of globalisation, state intervention and rent appropriation are 
important instruments for enlarging competitiveness. Export-oriented manufacturing as 
the centrepiece of liberal development thinking does not imply the dominance of the 
market, but the intelligent utilisation of the market in order to combine market and state 
intervention.  
The conditions of successful export-oriented industrialisation are very similar to 
the conditions of self-centred growth and social reform-based growth of the variants of 
modernisation theory mentioned above or growth based agrarian reform. In all these three 
variants of interventions the success in overcoming development depends on the impact 
of the measures on reducing marginality. In all three variants, overcoming 
underdevelopment requires complementing the market via empowerment of labour and 
mass demand wherever the market does not lead to high levels of employment.  
 
4. GLOBALISATION AND OVERCOMING UNDERDEVELOPMENT 
Underdevelopment is characterised by the simultaneous availability of surplus 
[Bagchi (1973: 20)]  and the absence of economic agents who can transform that surplus 
into investment via their entitlements on the market. Potentially available surplus may not 
be produced for various reasons, notably overvalued exchange rates or unemployment. 
Due to its availability, some agents gain access to the surplus on the basis of market 
imperfections and state failure. This private nonmarket access to surplus appears to the 
public as corruption. Even states which defend the interests of their masses cannot avoid 
the particularistic strategies of regional administrations, enterprises, party sub-
organisations etc., which ultimately subvert their lines of communication and their 
formalised command structures [Elsenhans (1996: 275–301)].  States always can only use 
top down orders like formal law for guiding their administrations. Democratic 
participation implies always a problem of delegation with the risk of representatives 
becoming independent from their constituencies. 
An early inception of the capitalist mechanism would strengthen less personalised 
channels of command and communication and thus help to successfully channel 
inevitably emerging rents into overcoming underdevelopment: expansion of mass 
incomes will trigger market oriented investment to the detriment of those rents the state 
cannot appropriate for investment. The demand of small and medium industries for 
locally produced investment goods does not only create the technical capabilities for 
further technical development, but additional demand from which profit can emerge. 
Reconstructing development theory brings together the basis of development theory with 
a Keynesian theory of capitalism. On the basis of such theories of overcoming 
underdevelopment, strategies can be formulated which combine the elements of 
10 Hartmut Elsenhans 
expanding mass demand, promotion of industries through state subsidies, and the 
disempowerment of traditional rentiers. In formulating such policies for different 
economies, the political dialogue can be re-constituted in many countries where the 
political impact of the Washington consensus liberalisation and, in parallel, rent-based 
private enrichment has led to political polarisation.  
Globalisation presents opportunities for such strategies. It can create expanding 
markets for all underdeveloped economies capable of devaluation. It discharges the state 
apparatuses from some major tasks in economic regulation, especially reducing, albeit 
not abolishing, the state‘s role in investment in the manufacturing sector while subverting 
those that have fallen prey to systemic corruption. Although state intervention may 
accelerate the achievement of international competitiveness by state-financed 
manipulation of comparative advantage, the steps towards export orientation can start 
without such state intervention. State intervention can be introduced long after the growth 
of manufacturing production, when safeguards against self-privileging and corruption in 
the newly emergent state apparatus have already been installed.  
Export orientation based on the employment of the large mass of unskilled labour 
causes a shift in political power. The struggle for participation in economic growth and 
wider economic and political enfranchisement becomes easier for the large mass of 
unskilled workers. It allows for gradualism in the upgrading process as new industries do 
not have to adjust to always limited internal demand but can avail themselves of the 
whole world market in case of appropriate exchange rates. 
Export-oriented industrialisation goes with the displacement of high income jobs 
in the former industrialised world by relatively poorly paid jobs in the catching up world, 
which in addition are ‗sold‘ on the world market at an undervalued exchange rate. The 
implied under consumption threats could be overcome if the industrial world proceeded 
to rapid structural adjustment by deliberately increasing its own mass consumption and 
developing new branches of production to create new jobs, for example in energy saving 
technologies. Business in the West has often argued that the loss of jobs in the leading 
industrialised countries is less due to relocation of production to the South, but to 
sluggish growth in the West. In states of under consumption, productivity growth 
outstrips production growth [Erber (2012: 3); Hsieh (1973: 16)]. This is the usual 
hallmark of under consumption [Woytinsky (1935:165)] and indicates that industrial 
countries have not managed to engage in accelerating growth in order to achieve 
structural adjustment. 
Reasons include the increasing heterogeneity of industrial countries‘ working 
classes, the increasing importance of non-material needs, and the shift of even the lower 
income strata to saving for the future. Increased savings for a myriad of reasons and 
increasing blockages for increasing mass incomes all contribute to decelerating demand.
4
 
The new competitiveness of the South through devaluation intensifies these 
problems in the West, but the solution does not lie in limiting export orientation in the 
South but in simultaneous expansion of demand in the West and in the South. 
Accelerating growth in the South by rapidly overcoming underdevelopment would 
contribute to maintaining capitalism at the global level. It would create legitimacy for 
 
4
The reasons are multiple and cannot be discussed at length here [Elsenhans (2014:214f.)], but all these 
tendencies are reinforced by the competition between the West and the South for growth-promoting demand. 
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purposeful redistribution and state intervention in the underdeveloped economies. Such 
an approach could appear to the sceptics of Washington consensus visions of capitalism 
as a pragmatic and non-dogmatic approach. It could act as a discussion platform for 
critical forces in the Global South.  
One form of increasing consumption is the production of goods through 
environmentally safer methods. Preserving capitalism by increasing this type of 
qualitatively ‗better‘ consumption fits with the environmentalist critiques of capitalism 
and does not jeopardise profit. More environmentally-minded production leads to 
substantial investment and hence to more profit as profit is not residual, rather is the 
result of spending on investment.  
Where state-led attempts at overcoming underdevelopment have failed, the 
political and moral discredit of the old, mostly secular, state classes has led to the rise of 
new cultural identitarian movements which present their own versions of capitalism 
through moral economy [Elsenhans (2012); Elsenhans, Ouaissa, Schwecke, and Tétreault 
(2015)]. The arguments of these movements may vary, but they uniformly set limits 
against the accumulation of wealth, the (over-)exploitation of labour, and the 
discretionary power of the owners of property. By insisting on the conditions of capitalist 
growth with mass demand a similar scenario emerges as a condition for the maintenance 
of capitalism. 
It would therefore be worthwhile to establish whether those interested in 
maintaining the progressive elements of capitalism against rent seeking/rent-based 
structures and the followers of moral economy from whatever cultural background can 
establish a fruitful dialogue on how to re-orientate the world economy in order to avoid 
the globalisation of rent. For Keynesians, this may allow the globalisation of profit while 
for others, such as new cultural identitarian movements, this will be the successful 
defence of moral principles in society. Inevitable divergences on the interpretation of 
these outcomes should not block dialogue on possible agreements on pragmatic 
regulations. The alternative would be the continued committal to a non-realistic 
interpretation of capitalism, which in reality defends rent while destroying capitalism. 
Mainstream opinion still creates the illusion of being capable of organising a feasible 
worldwide cooperation between social forces for managing the world economy. 
Keynesians and new cultural identitarian political movements share their opposition to 
this view for different reasons, but should seek to find a common plausible understanding 
on practical issues and pragmatically converging strategies in order to compete against 
the current Washington-type consensus. 
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